The Gentlemen ransomware group: methods and how to recognize it
This ransomware group has been recorded attacking organizations in Japan. Every fact on this page comes from a primary source we checked, such as MITRE ATT&CK, government agencies, or security vendors’ own research. The number after each sentence points to its source.
Other names in the sources: Storm-2697[1], GOLD SHERWOOD[1]
Records in Japan
ransomware.live records 24 claims by this group with Japan as the country (records up to 2026-11-20). These count claims, not victims. A listing does not confirm that the claimed event happened.
Worldwide, ransomware.live has recorded 1,081 postings on this group’s leak site (postings are the attacker’s claims, not counts confirmed by the victims). The first posting is dated 2023-02-28 and the last 2026-11-03 (as of 2026-11-11). The site holds 0 negotiation chats and 3 ransom-note variants for this group.
Incidents in this site’s DB that the organizations announced themselves, where a claim about the same case names this group (8)
- Saga University administrative information system
- Akatake Engineering
- Oriental Diamond
- Marutake
- Omikenshi
- Medica Publishing
- Nishiyama Seisakusho
- Sincere
Source: Ransomware.live(opens in a new tab)
Overview
MITRE ATT&CK lists the group as G1058 and its ransomware as software S9051. According to MITRE, it was first seen in mid-2025 and started as a closed operation, then became ransomware-as-a-service (RaaS), recruiting affiliates, in September 2025.[1]
Microsoft tracks the operators as Storm-2697. The operators run the RaaS and affiliates carry out the attacks. It uses double extortion: it encrypts data and pressures victims to pay by threatening to publish stolen information.[2]
In leaked material analyzed by Check Point, the operators recruited affiliates with a split of 90% to the affiliate and 10% to the operators.[5]
The encryptor is written in Go. According to Check Point, the versions for Windows, Linux, NAS, and BSD are written in Go, and the ESXi version is a separate one written in C.[2][4]
Cisco Talos’s count of incidents in Japan for January to July 2026 names The Gentlemen as the most active group, with 14 confirmed victims.[8]
Methods
- Trend Micro could not confirm the entry point in the cases it studied, but says an internet-facing FortiGate was likely the way in. Kaspersky writes that the usual entry points are vulnerabilities in exposed VPNs and firewalls, and stolen or weak credentials.[3][7]
- Check Point’s quarterly report says the group mainly exploited the FortiOS vulnerability CVE-2024-55591. Check Point’s own analysis of the leaked material, however, says it cannot confirm that the targeted devices were actually vulnerable.[6][5]
- The ransomware is distributed through the domain’s NETLOGON share and Group Policy (GPO), so encryption starts almost at once on domain-joined machines. PsExec is the fallback when GPO cannot be used.[7][4]
- To stop security products, it loads signed but vulnerable drivers (bring your own vulnerable driver, BYOVD). According to MITRE, the operators give affiliates a custom EDR-killing tool called GentleKiller.[3][1]
- According to Microsoft, the encryptor can spread by itself and tries 21 remote execution methods on each machine, including PsExec, WMI, scheduled tasks, services, and PowerShell remoting.[2]
- Before encrypting, it stops backup, database, and security services, deletes shadow copies, and clears event logs.[3]
- Trend Micro writes that the attackers installed Nmap and used it to scan the internal network. Talos found traces in infrastructure that appears to belong to attackers linked to the group showing that Masscan and Nmap were used to probe external hosts and sqlmap was used to attempt SQL injection.[3][8]
ATT&CK techniques
Tools
Explained on this site
Other tools named in the sources
Found on infrastructure believed to be used by an actor associated with this group
The source found traces of these on an open directory believed to have been used by a threat actor associated with this group. It does not state that the group itself used them.
Have you patched these vulnerabilities?
We list only CVEs that a source says this group exploited and that we checked in CISA’s KEV catalog (known exploited vulnerabilities) and NVD. If your organization runs an affected product, check the vendor’s fix.
| CVE | Product | Added to KEV | Fix |
|---|---|---|---|
| CVE-2024-55591(opens in a new tab)[6] | Fortinet FortiOS / FortiProxy | 2025-01-14 | Vendor advisory(opens in a new tab) |
How to recognize its ransom notes
We do not publish ransom notes in full. This section gives only the clues for recognizing them.
- The ransom note is named README-GENTLEMEN.txt and is left in each encrypted folder.[2]
- According to Check Point, the Windows note opens with this line, says data was stolen, and says it will be published on the leak site if there is no contact. It gives Tox and Session as the ways to make contact.
Gentlemen, your network has been encrypted.
[4] - Encrypted files get a six-character alphanumeric extension, but the string differs between builds, so do not rely on the extension alone. According to Microsoft, it also changes the desktop wallpaper after encrypting.[2][3][9]
Sources
- The Gentlemen, Storm-2697, GOLD SHERWOOD, Group G1058(opens in a new tab)
- The Gentlemen ransomware: Dissecting a self-propagating Go encryptor(opens in a new tab)
- Unmasking The Gentlemen Ransomware: Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures Revealed(opens in a new tab)
- DFIR Report - The Gentlemen & SystemBC: A Sneak Peek Behind the Proxy(opens in a new tab)
- Thus Spoke...The Gentlemen(opens in a new tab)
- The State of Ransomware - Q1 2026(opens in a new tab)
- The Gentlemen RaaS(opens in a new tab)
- Ransomware incidents in Japan in the first half of 2026(opens in a new tab)
- Threat Hunting Case Study: The Gentlemen(opens in a new tab)
- Known Exploited Vulnerabilities Catalog(opens in a new tab)
Content updated: 2026-11-08
How we chose and wrote this page: we picked groups active in Japan from the “claims about the same case” on this site’s incidents and from ransomware.live’s counts for Japan. ransomware.live’s group descriptions were used only as leads, not as sources for the text. We do not state attribution (country or people).