SafePay ransomware group: methods and how to recognize it

This ransomware group has been recorded attacking organizations in Japan. Every fact on this page comes from a primary source we checked, such as MITRE ATT&CK, government agencies, or security vendors’ own research. The number after each sentence points to its source.

Records in Japan

ransomware.live records 13 claims by this group with Japan as the country (records up to 2026-11-20). These count claims, not victims. A listing does not confirm that the claimed event happened.

Worldwide, ransomware.live has recorded 613 postings on this group’s leak site (postings are the attacker’s claims, not counts confirmed by the victims). The first posting is dated 2023-11-10 and the last 2026-11-07 (as of 2026-11-11). The site holds 0 negotiation chats and 2 ransom-note variants for this group.

Incidents in this site’s DB that the organizations announced themselves, where a claim about the same case names this group (2)

Source: Ransomware.live(opens in a new tab)

Overview

A joint advisory by CISA, the FBI, and partners says SafePay has been highly active since August 2024 and has hit at least 600 organizations, including businesses and critical infrastructure in North America, South America, Europe, and Australia.[2]

It uses double extortion: it steals data, encrypts systems, and threatens to publish the stolen data. The advisory says the actors sometimes call victims directly.[2]

Huntress first saw SafePay in October 2024 in two unrelated customer incidents. It describes a closed operation, not ransomware-as-a-service (RaaS): the same core team handles access, deployment, and extortion. Bitdefender also describes it as a group that does not use the RaaS model.[3][4]

Huntress’s analysis found that the encryptor overlaps heavily with the leaked LockBit Black source code in its command-line flags and encryption logic. Bitdefender, however, says there is strong evidence that SafePay operates independently of LockBit’s people, given differences in how it operates and encrypts.[3][4]

According to Huntress, it stops without encrypting when the system language uses the Cyrillic script.[3]

Methods

  • Initial access comes from exposed credentials, brute-force password attacks, and VPN access. The advisory gives examples of entry with account details obtained by phishing.[1]
  • For lateral movement it uses legitimate tools and services: PsExec, WinRM, remote management software, and RDP. The actors look for credentials with admin rights and create new accounts when needed.[1]
  • The actors often disable security software before moving laterally. In some cases they changed system users’ passwords so that legitimate users could no longer log in.[1]
  • Data is compressed with tools such as 7-Zip and WinRAR and sent with WinSCP or RClone to accounts the actors control. OneDrive was used in some cases.[1]
  • To block recovery, the actors stop the Volume Shadow Copy service and reset NAS devices that hold backups to factory settings.[1]
  • Encryption combines the ChaCha20 cipher with RSA. In the incidents Huntress saw, encryption started by loading a DLL through regsvr32.exe.[1][3]

ATT&CK techniques

Tools

Other tools named in the sources

Have you patched these vulnerabilities?

We list only CVEs that a source says this group exploited and that we checked in CISA’s KEV catalog (known exploited vulnerabilities) and NVD. If your organization runs an affected product, check the vendor’s fix.

How to recognize its ransom notes

We do not publish ransom notes in full. This section gives only the clues for recognizing them.

  • Encrypted files get the .safepay extension, and the ransom note is named readme_safepay.txt.[3][4]
  • Bitdefender reports that the note opens with this line: Greetings! Your corporate network was attacked by SafePay team.[4]
  • The note tells victims to make contact through a Tor chat. According to Bitdefender, it says the data will be published if there is no contact within 10 days.[1][4]

Sources

  1. #StopRansomware: SafePay Ransomware (AA26-293A)(opens in a new tab)CISA, FBI, USSS, et al. · published 2026-10-20 · checked 2026-11-08
  2. CISA, FBI and Partners Release Joint Cybersecurity Advisory on SafePay Ransomware(opens in a new tab)CISA · published 2026-10-20 · checked 2026-11-08
  3. SafePay Ransomware: How It Works & How to Stop It(opens in a new tab)Huntress · checked 2026-11-08
  4. SafePay Ransomware: How a Non-RaaS Group Executes Rapid Fire Attacks(opens in a new tab)Bitdefender · published 2025-09-04 · checked 2026-11-08
  5. Known Exploited Vulnerabilities Catalog(opens in a new tab)CISA · checked 2026-11-08

Content updated: 2026-11-08

How we chose and wrote this page: we picked groups active in Japan from the “claims about the same case” on this site’s incidents and from ransomware.live’s counts for Japan. ransomware.live’s group descriptions were used only as leads, not as sources for the text. We do not state attribution (country or people).

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