RansomHub ransomware group: methods and how to recognize it

This ransomware group has been recorded attacking organizations in Japan. Every fact on this page comes from a primary source we checked, such as MITRE ATT&CK, government agencies, or security vendors’ own research. The number after each sentence points to its source.

Other names in the sources: Cyclops[1], Knight[1]

Records in Japan

ransomware.live records 12 claims by this group with Japan as the country (records up to 2026-11-20). These count claims, not victims. A listing does not confirm that the claimed event happened.

Worldwide, ransomware.live has recorded 842 postings on this group’s leak site (postings are the attacker’s claims, not counts confirmed by the victims). The first posting is dated 2023-03-09 and the last 2025-03-31 (as of 2026-11-11). The site holds 1 negotiation chats and 4 ransom-note variants for this group.

No incident in this site’s DB has a claim about the same case naming this group yet.

Source: Ransomware.live(opens in a new tab)

Overview

A joint advisory by the FBI, CISA, MS-ISAC, and HHS describes RansomHub as a ransomware-as-a-service (RaaS) operation formerly known as Cyclops and Knight. It says that since it began in February 2024, RansomHub has encrypted and exfiltrated data from at least 210 victims in critical infrastructure sectors such as water, IT, government, healthcare, emergency services, food and agriculture, finance, manufacturing, transportation, and communications.[1]

It uses double extortion: it encrypts systems and steals data to pressure victims. The advisory says the way data is stolen depends on the affiliate that carried out the intrusion.[1]

The sources differ on how they describe the link to Knight. CISA says RansomHub was formerly known as Cyclops and Knight. Group-IB says the operators likely acquired the ransomware and web application source code from Knight (formerly Cyclops), and MITRE says they may have purchased and rebranded Knight’s resources.[1][3][2]

According to Group-IB, the operators advertised their affiliate program on the underground forum RAMP on February 2, 2024. It says they launched the program while LockBit and ALPHV were under law enforcement pressure, and recruited affiliates from both groups.[3]

MITRE and Group-IB say the ransomware has versions for Windows, ESXi, Linux, and FreeBSD. According to Group-IB, a version announced in July 2024 encrypts files on a remote SFTP server instead of local files.[2][3]

In a February 2025 article, Group-IB says RansomHub targeted more than 600 organizations worldwide and was the most active ransomware group in 2024. ZeroFox says it accounted for about 10 percent of global ransomware and digital extortion incidents at the end of 2024.[3][4]

According to a ZeroFox report dated April 9, 2025, RansomHub’s leak site has been offline since April 1 and no new victims have appeared. Around April 4, an account associated with DragonForce posted on RAMP, claiming that RansomHub “will be up soon” and had decided to move to DragonForce’s infrastructure (the second half is ZeroFox’s paraphrase). ZeroFox says it saw no evidence that control of RansomHub’s infrastructure had been transferred or that its affiliates had joined DragonForce, and assesses that RansomHub is very likely non-operational.[4]

Sophos says that after posts appeared in April on RansomHub’s leak site and on RAMP suggesting a collaboration with DragonForce, the leak site went offline. Sophos’s view is that the “collaboration” appears to have been more of a hostile takeover by DragonForce.[5]

Methods

  • Initial access comes from mass phishing and spear-phishing emails, known vulnerabilities in internet-facing systems, and password spraying against accounts exposed in data breaches. The advisory says exploit code is obtained from sources such as ExploitDB and GitHub.[1]
  • In an incident Group-IB handled, the affiliate first tried CVE-2024-3400 in Palo Alto Networks PAN-OS, but the public exploit script did not work as expected. It then brute-forced the VPN with a dictionary of more than 5,000 usernames and passwords and got in through a default account used by a backup product.[3]
  • After getting in, affiliates create accounts, re-enable disabled accounts, and use Mimikatz to collect credentials and escalate to SYSTEM. For lateral movement they use RDP, PsExec, AnyDesk, ConnectWise, N-able, Cobalt Strike, Metasploit, and similar tools.[1]
  • In Group-IB’s incident, the attacker scanned the internal network with Angry IP Scanner, Nmap, and PowerShell, then exploited CVE-2021-42278 and CVE-2020-1472 on a domain controller to gain full privileges. It then created a shared folder on a NAS and placed the tools for the next stage there.[3]
  • To avoid detection, affiliates rename the ransomware executable to an innocuous name such as Windows.exe and leave it in the desktop or downloads folder, clear Windows and Linux logs, and use WMI to disable antivirus products. In some cases they deployed dedicated tools to disable EDR.[1]
  • In Group-IB’s incident, the attacker stopped the backup service, uploaded PCHunter to terminate the EDR, and only then ran the ransomware. Group-IB also analyzed a dedicated tool that abuses a vulnerable driver to kill security products.[3]
  • The ransomware binary itself has no data exfiltration mechanism. Observed exfiltration tools include PuTTY, AWS S3 tools, HTTP POST requests, WinSCP, Rclone, Cobalt Strike, and Metasploit. In Group-IB’s incident, the attacker placed FileZilla on servers holding critical data and uploaded it to external servers.[1][3]
  • It encrypts with the elliptic-curve algorithm Curve25519, using a key pair unique to each victim organization. To encrypt files in use, it stops many processes such as database and mail software. It does not encrypt executable files, and it uses vssadmin.exe to delete volume shadow copies.[1]
  • For large files it encrypts only portions at regular intervals to finish faster. CISA describes encrypting 1 MB chunks and skipping 2 MB, while the version Group-IB analyzed defaults to encrypting 1 MB and skipping 3 MB, so the setting differs by version.[1][3]
  • Group-IB’s analysis says the Windows version cannot decrypt its embedded configuration unless a passphrase is given at launch (-pass). With -safeboot, it uses bcdedit to reboot into Safe Mode and sets up automatic logon before encrypting. It also collects virtual machine information and forcibly stops the machines, and deletes the Security, System, and Application event logs.[3]

ATT&CK techniques

Tools

Explained on this site

Other tools named in the sources

Have you patched these vulnerabilities?

We list only CVEs that a source says this group exploited and that we checked in CISA’s KEV catalog (known exploited vulnerabilities) and NVD. If your organization runs an affected product, check the vendor’s fix.

How to recognize its ransom notes

We do not publish ransom notes in full. This section gives only the clues for recognizing them.

  • Encrypted files get a random extension. For the ransom note name, CISA gives How To Restore Your Files.txt, while the version Group-IB analyzed writes README_<random>.txt into each encrypted directory, so the name varies by version.[1][3]
  • The advisory says the note generally contains no initial ransom demand or payment instructions, only a client ID and a unique .onion URL to open in Tor. The time given before the data is published ranges from 3 to 90 days, depending on the affiliate.[1]

Sources

  1. #StopRansomware: RansomHub Ransomware (AA24-242A)(opens in a new tab)CISA, FBI, MS-ISAC, HHS · published 2024-08-29 · checked 2026-11-11
  2. RansomHub, Software S1212(opens in a new tab)MITRE ATT&CK · checked 2026-11-11
  3. RansomHub Never Sleeps Episode 1: The evolution of modern ransomware(opens in a new tab)Group-IB · published 2025-02-12 · checked 2026-11-11
  4. Flash Report: Speculation Unfolds Surrounding RansomHub Cessation?(opens in a new tab)ZeroFox · published 2025-04-09 · checked 2026-11-11
  5. DragonForce targets rivals in a play for dominance(opens in a new tab)Sophos Counter Threat Unit · checked 2026-11-11
  6. Known Exploited Vulnerabilities Catalog(opens in a new tab)CISA · checked 2026-11-11

Content updated: 2026-11-11

How we chose and wrote this page: we picked groups active in Japan from the “claims about the same case” on this site’s incidents and from ransomware.live’s counts for Japan. ransomware.live’s group descriptions were used only as leads, not as sources for the text. We do not state attribution (country or people).

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