Clop ransomware group: methods and how to recognize it
This ransomware group has been recorded attacking organizations in Japan. Every fact on this page comes from a primary source we checked, such as MITRE ATT&CK, government agencies, or security vendors’ own research. The number after each sentence points to its source.
Other names in the sources: CL0P[2], TA505[2]
Records in Japan
ransomware.live records 15 claims by this group with Japan as the country (records up to 2026-11-20). These count claims, not victims. A listing does not confirm that the claimed event happened.
Worldwide, ransomware.live has recorded 1,303 postings on this group’s leak site (postings are the attacker’s claims, not counts confirmed by the victims). The first posting is dated 2020-03-13 and the last 2026-10-21 (as of 2026-11-11). The site holds 0 negotiation chats and 5 ransom-note variants for this group.
No incident in this site’s DB has a claim about the same case naming this group yet.
Source: Ransomware.live(opens in a new tab)
Overview
MITRE ATT&CK lists Clop as software S0611, a Windows ransomware first observed in February 2019 and a variant of CryptoMix. MITRE names TA505 as a group that uses it.[1]
The joint advisory AA23-158A by CISA and the FBI describes CL0P as also known as TA505 and says it has been used as ransomware-as-a-service (RaaS). It adds that in campaigns since 2021, the group preferred to rely mostly on data exfiltration over encryption.[2]
Its signature pattern is to exploit zero-day vulnerabilities (flaws unknown before a fix exists) in internet-facing file transfer products, steal data from many organizations at once, and start extortion several weeks later. CISA says TA505 ran zero-day campaigns against Accellion FTA in 2020 and 2021, GoAnywhere MFT in early 2023, and MOVEit Transfer in May 2023.[2][7]
According to Google Threat Intelligence Group (GTIG), the CL0P leak site was set up in 2020 and was first used for extortion involving CL0P ransomware that GTIG attributed to FIN11. More recently, most alleged victims are tied to data-theft extortion built on mass exploitation of zero-days in file transfer products. GTIG also says the CL0P name and leak site have been used by at least one actor whose tactics differ from FIN11, so an incident labeled as CL0P does not necessarily come from the same operators.[7]
GTIG reports that starting September 29, 2025, an actor claiming affiliation with the CL0P brand began emailing executives at many organizations, alleging theft of data from their Oracle E-Business Suite environments. It says months of intrusion activity came first, and that what may be CVE-2025-61882 was exploited as a zero-day as early as August 9, 2025, weeks before a patch. GTIG has not formally attributed this activity to a tracked threat group.[7]
In 2026, data theft through the PTC Windchill and FlexPLM vulnerability CVE-2026-12569 was reported. ReliaQuest assesses it as highly likely the work of Clop, and Ransom-ISAC suspects Cl0p-affiliated actors most likely used it as a zero-day in early June 2026.[8][9]
In November 2021, INTERPOL announced that six people suspected of facilitating the transfer and cash-out of assets for Cl0p had been arrested in Ukraine in June of that year. The operation, named Operation Cyclone, was coordinated by INTERPOL with Korean, Ukrainian, and US authorities, and USD 185,000 in cash was seized.[12]
Methods
- The pattern runs: exploit a zero-day in an internet-facing transfer product, steal the data stored in the product, and send threats weeks later. GTIG writes that in most of these incidents the actors started extortion several weeks after stealing the data.[7]
- In the Accellion FTA campaign, Mandiant says an actor it tracks as UNC2546 exploited multiple zero-days from mid-December 2020 and installed a web shell called DEWMODE. Entry was a SQL injection through a crafted Host header, followed by an eval-style web shell. From the timing of the requests, Mandiant believes this web shell delivered DEWMODE, but says the available evidence does not show the exact mechanism. DEWMODE pulled a file list from the FTA’s MySQL database and displayed it, and the actor downloaded files chosen from that list. At the end it removed its own files and log entries.[3]
- From late January 2021, organizations hit by UNC2546 began receiving emails threatening to publish the stolen data on the “CL0P^_- LEAKS” Tor site. Mandiant tracks the theft as UNC2546 and the extortion as UNC2582 and sees overlaps between the two and earlier FIN11 operations. No ransomware was deployed in this extortion. CISA attributes the same campaign to TA505.[3][2]
- For GoAnywhere MFT, Fortra says that between January 28 and 30, 2023, an unauthorized party used a previously unknown remote code execution vulnerability (CVE-2023-0669) to get into some customer environments of its MFTaaS (Fortra-operated) service. It created unauthorized user accounts and, for some customers, downloaded stored files. It also installed Netcat and Errors.jsp. The flaw was also used against a small number of on-premises installations, pushing the timeline back to January 18, and Fortra says customers with an admin portal exposed to the internet were at higher risk.[5]
- CISA attributes the GoAnywhere campaign to CL0P. The group claimed to have taken data affecting about 130 victims over roughly 10 days (CISA writes this as a claim). Lateral movement from GoAnywhere into victim networks was not identified, suggesting the breach was limited to the platform itself. Weeks later, as the group sorted the stolen data, ransom notes went to senior executives of victim organizations, threatening to publish the files on the leak site unless paid.[2]
- For MOVEit Transfer, CISA says that from May 27, 2023 the actors exploited the SQL injection vulnerability CVE-2023-34362 and installed a web shell called LEMURLOOT. It is written in C# and was first seen named human2.aspx to mimic the legitimate human.aspx. It can download files, retrieve Azure settings, and create or delete users. Mandiant writes that in some cases data was stolen within minutes of the web shell being installed.[2][4]
- In the MOVEit case, victims did not receive any ransom demand at first. On June 6, 2023, a post on the leak site claimed responsibility and threatened to publish the stolen data unless victims paid. Mandiant merged this activity into FIN11 on the same day, citing overlaps in targeting, infrastructure, certificates, and the leak site.[4]
- For Cleo products (Harmony, VLTrader, LexiCom), Huntress saw mass exploitation on December 3, 2024. Files dropped into the autorun directory through an arbitrary file write were run through the product’s own import feature to execute PowerShell, which then fetched JAR files with web-shell-like functions from an external host. According to GTIG, this Cleo exploitation was by UNC5936, a suspected FIN11 cluster, and many victims on the CL0P leak site appear to come from zero-days in file transfer products including Cleo LexiCom.[6][7]
- For Oracle E-Business Suite, GTIG saw activity targeting /OA_HTML/configurator/UiServlet in July 2025 and says there were several exploit chains. The leaked exploit combines SSRF, CRLF injection, authentication bypass, and XSL template injection to reach remote code execution, but GTIG says it lacks the evidence to tie the July activity to that leaked exploit. After entry, Java implants such as GOLDVEIN.JAVA and the SAGE family were used.[7]
- The Oracle extortion emails were sent from hundreds if not thousands of compromised accounts at unrelated organizations, with credentials likely taken from infostealer malware logs. They were addressed to executives and backed up with genuine file listings. No amount or payment method was given at first.[7]
- For Windchill, PTC disclosed CVE-2026-12569 on June 17, 2026 and released patches in stages. PTC says JSP web shells named with 16 lowercase hex characters are dropped under /Windchill/login/, and tells customers to search logs for POSTs to that path. According to ReliaQuest, the web shell is built specifically for Windchill: it decrypts stored credentials, maps the file vault, and can move to data theft without extra tools. It also contains a Java class loader that can run additional code in memory.[10][8]
- Ransom-ISAC describes the Windchill attack as a chain of an unauthenticated information disclosure in the FlexPLM WSDL endpoint and a flaw in the Windchill login servlet. From July 20, 2026, emails with a subject line about a “Windchill PDMLink module serious data leak” appear to have been sent from randomly compromised accounts to hundreds of users inside affected organizations.[9]
- For post-compromise activity, CISA lists Cobalt Strike among CL0P’s tools and writes that the actors attempted to compromise Active Directory servers using SMB vulnerabilities, with follow-on Cobalt Strike activity. They also used RDP to interact with compromised systems. GTIG, on the other hand, assesses that targeting public-facing applications that store sensitive data lets attackers steal it without spending time or effort on lateral movement.[2][7]
- MITRE writes that the ransomware itself can encrypt with AES, RSA, and RC4, delete shadow volumes with vssadmin, and disable recovery options with bcdedit. Unit 42 observed samples that try to kill processes and services tied to backup and security products. In 2019 it was delivered through phishing with macro-enabled documents and a loader called Get2.[1][11][2]
ATT&CK techniques
Tools
Other tools named in the sources
Found on infrastructure believed to be used by an actor associated with this group
The source found traces of these on an open directory believed to have been used by a threat actor associated with this group. It does not state that the group itself used them.
Have you patched these vulnerabilities?
We list only CVEs that a source says this group exploited and that we checked in CISA’s KEV catalog (known exploited vulnerabilities) and NVD. If your organization runs an affected product, check the vendor’s fix.
| CVE | Product | Added to KEV | Fix |
|---|---|---|---|
| CVE-2021-27101(opens in a new tab)[3] | Accellion FTA(SQL インジェクション) | 2021-11-03 | Vendor advisory(opens in a new tab) |
| CVE-2021-27102(opens in a new tab)[3] | Accellion FTA(OS コマンド実行) | 2021-11-03 | Vendor advisory(opens in a new tab) |
| CVE-2021-27103(opens in a new tab)[3] | Accellion FTA(SSRF) | 2021-11-03 | Vendor advisory(opens in a new tab) |
| CVE-2021-27104(opens in a new tab)[3] | Accellion FTA(OS コマンド実行) | 2021-11-03 | Vendor advisory(opens in a new tab) |
| CVE-2023-0669(opens in a new tab)[2] | Fortra GoAnywhere MFT | 2023-02-10 | Vendor advisory(opens in a new tab) |
| CVE-2023-34362(opens in a new tab)[2] | Progress MOVEit Transfer | 2023-06-02 | Vendor advisory(opens in a new tab) |
| CVE-2026-12569(opens in a new tab)[8] | PTC Windchill / FlexPLM(出典は「可能性が非常に高い」と留保) | 2026-06-25 | Vendor advisory(opens in a new tab) |
How to recognize its ransom notes
We do not publish ransom notes in full. This section gives only the clues for recognizing them.
- Some data-theft incidents against file transfer products involve no encryption (Mandiant writes that no ransomware was deployed in the 2021 Accellion case). The threat reaches the victim’s executives with a list of the stolen data attached. The ransom note CISA showed for the GoAnywhere campaign opens with this line:
Hello, this is the CL0P hacker group.
[2][3] - The Oracle emails came from compromised third-party accounts, which GTIG says helps them look legitimate and bypass spam filters. The Windchill emails carried the product name and “serious data leak” in the subject.
Windchill PDMLink module serious data leak
[7][9] - For the versions that encrypt, Unit 42 observed extensions .clop as well as .CIIp, .Cllp, and .C_L_O_P. Ransom note file names also vary by version: ClopReadMe.txt, README_README.txt, Cl0pReadMe.txt, and READ_ME_!!!.TXT are listed.[11]
Sources
- Clop, Software S0611(opens in a new tab)
- #StopRansomware: CL0P Ransomware Gang Exploits CVE-2023-34362 MOVEit Vulnerability (AA23-158A)(opens in a new tab)
- Cyber Criminals Exploit Accellion FTA for Data Theft and Extortion(opens in a new tab)
- Zero-Day Vulnerability in MOVEit Transfer Exploited for Data Theft(opens in a new tab)
- Summary of the Investigation Related to CVE-2023-0669(opens in a new tab)
- Threat Advisory: Oh No Cleo! Cleo Software Actively Being Exploited in the Wild(opens in a new tab)
- Oracle E-Business Suite Zero-Day Exploited in Widespread Extortion Campaign(opens in a new tab)
- Clop Returns with Custom Implant in Mass-Extortion Campaign(opens in a new tab)
- Cl0p Exploitation of PTC Windchill & FlexPLM (CVE-2026-12569)(opens in a new tab)
- Customer & Partner Updates: Remote Code Execution Vulnerability in PTC’s Windchill and FlexPLM Solutions(opens in a new tab)
- Threat Assessment: Clop Ransomware(opens in a new tab)
- INTERPOL-led operation takes down prolific cybercrime ring(opens in a new tab)
- Known Exploited Vulnerabilities Catalog(opens in a new tab)
Content updated: 2026-11-11
How we chose and wrote this page: we picked groups active in Japan from the “claims about the same case” on this site’s incidents and from ransomware.live’s counts for Japan. ransomware.live’s group descriptions were used only as leads, not as sources for the text. We do not state attribution (country or people).