ALPHV (BlackCat) ransomware group: methods and how to recognize it

This ransomware group has been recorded attacking organizations in Japan. Every fact on this page comes from a primary source we checked, such as MITRE ATT&CK, government agencies, or security vendors’ own research. The number after each sentence points to its source.

Other names in the sources: BlackCat[6], Noberus[6]

Records in Japan

ransomware.live records 11 claims by this group with Japan as the country (records up to 2026-11-20). These count claims, not victims. A listing does not confirm that the claimed event happened.

Worldwide, ransomware.live has recorded 731 postings on this group’s leak site (postings are the attacker’s claims, not counts confirmed by the victims). The first posting is dated 2021-09-09 and the last 2024-03-03 (as of 2026-11-11). The site holds 0 negotiation chats and 4 ransom-note variants for this group.

No incident in this site’s DB has a claim about the same case naming this group yet.

Source: Ransomware.live(opens in a new tab)

Overview

MITRE ATT&CK lists BlackCat as software S1068. It is ransomware written in Rust and has been offered as ransomware-as-a-service (RaaS). First observed in November 2021, it has been used against multiple sectors and organizations in Africa, the Americas, Asia, Australia, and Europe. ALPHV and Noberus are listed as associated names.[6]

In its December 2023 announcement, the US Department of Justice describes how the operation works. Developers create and update the ransomware and maintain the illicit infrastructure, while affiliates choose and attack high-value victims. After a victim pays, developers and affiliates share the ransom. Affiliates steal data first, then demand a ransom in exchange for decrypting the system and for not publishing the stolen data: a multiple-extortion model.[2]

In January 2022, Unit 42 reported that ALPHV was recruiting affiliates on cybercrime forums, letting them keep 80 to 90 percent of each ransom payment with the rest going to the author. It adds that affiliates are interviewed and vetted before being accepted.[10]

In an April 2022 FLASH, the FBI says that as of March 2022 the group had compromised at least 60 entities and was the first ransomware group to do so successfully using Rust. It also says many of the developers and money launderers are linked to DarkSide and BlackMatter, which it takes to indicate extensive networks and experience with ransomware operations.[5]

In June 2022, Microsoft reported that two affiliate groups, DEV-0237 (which had deployed Ryuk, Conti, and Hive) and DEV-0504 (which had deployed Ryuk, REvil, BlackMatter, and Conti), had started adopting BlackCat. It explains that BlackCat is not tied to a single attacker: entry points and procedures vary by affiliate, so no two deployments look the same.[7]

In October 2023, Microsoft reported that Octo Tempest, which it says overlaps with research on Scattered Spider and others, became an ALPHV/BlackCat affiliate in mid-2023. Since June 2023 it has deployed both the Windows and Linux payloads, and Microsoft says it has recently focused mainly on VMware ESXi servers.[8]

According to the CISA, FBI, and HHS advisory, the administrators announced the ALPHV Blackcat Ransomware 2.0 Sphynx update in February 2023. It was rewritten to give affiliates better defense evasion and additional tooling, and it can encrypt Windows and Linux devices and VMware instances.[1]

The Justice Department and the FBI announced a disruption campaign on December 19, 2023. The release says the FBI developed a decryption tool that let it offer more than 500 victims worldwide the means to restore their systems, gained visibility into the group’s computer network, and seized several websites the group operated. It says the group has targeted the networks of more than 1,000 victims since its inception.[2]

The February 2024 update to the advisory says the administrator posted a message encouraging affiliates to target hospitals after the operational action in early December 2023. Of the nearly 70 victims leaked since mid-December 2023, healthcare was the most common sector, which the agencies say is likely a response to that post. It says FBI investigations identified the activity as recently as February 2024.[1]

A US Attorney’s Office (Southern District of Florida) release dated April 30, 2026 says, based on court documents, that three men who deployed ALPHV BlackCat against US victims in 2023 all worked in the cybersecurity industry. They agreed to pay the ALPHV BlackCat administrators a 20 percent share of any ransom in exchange for access to the ransomware and the extortion platform.[3]

According to the same release, two of them were sentenced to four years in prison each. The third pleaded guilty in April 2026 and is described as having abused a role as a negotiator for ransomware victims by sharing confidential victim information with threat actors to raise the ransom paid. His sentencing was set for July 9 at the time of the release. In a July 9, 2026 release, the Justice Department says the third man was sentenced that day to 70 months in prison.[3][4]

Methods

  • Entry points differ by affiliate. The FBI says the actors use previously compromised user credentials, and the Justice Department lists compromised credentials among several initial access methods. Microsoft observed entry through remote desktop services using compromised credentials, and through unpatched Exchange servers.[5][2][7]
  • In April 2023, Mandiant reported that one affiliate (UNC4466) got in through internet-exposed Veritas Backup Exec installations vulnerable to CVE-2021-27876, CVE-2021-27877, and CVE-2021-27878. Because earlier ALPHV intrusions Mandiant investigated mostly started from stolen credentials, it sees this as a shift to opportunistic targeting of known vulnerabilities. It first observed exploitation on October 22, 2022, using a publicly released Metasploit module.[9]
  • According to the advisory, affiliates research the company, then call or text employees posing as IT or help desk staff to obtain credentials. They also use Evilginx2, an open-source adversary-in-the-middle framework, to capture multifactor authentication credentials, login credentials, and session cookies.[1]
  • For Octo Tempest, Microsoft reports calls to the help desk impersonating a user to get passwords reset or multifactor authentication methods changed. It also lists calling employees to get a remote monitoring and management (RMM) tool installed, steering them to a fake login portal built with an adversary-in-the-middle toolkit, and getting them to remove their FIDO2 token.[8]
  • Once inside, the actors install remote access software such as AnyDesk, Mega sync, and Splashtop to prepare for data exfiltration, and use tunneling tools such as Plink and Ngrok. They create an account named “aadmin” and use Kerberos token generation for domain access. The advisory says affiliates claim to use Cobalt Strike and Brute Ratel C4 as beacons.[1]
  • To move laterally, the actors collect passwords from domain controllers, the local network, and deleted backup servers. In Microsoft’s cases, attackers created an LSASS dump with Task Manager and saved it to a ZIP archive, stealing credentials without dropping a tool. In another case they changed the registry to allow cleartext WDigest authentication before dumping LSASS, and later also used Mimikatz.[1][7]
  • To evade detection, the advisory says affiliates use allowlisted applications such as Metasploit. It adds that, according to public reporting, affiliates have also used POORTRY and STONESTOP to terminate security processes.[1]
  • For exfiltration, the advisory says Mega.nz or Dropbox is used. In Microsoft’s case, the attackers used MEGAsync and Rclone, both renamed to legitimate Windows process names such as winlogon.exe and mstsc.exe. Exfiltration ran for several days across multiple devices, and ransomware deployment came two weeks after the initial compromise.[1][7]
  • The FBI says the actors stole data from cloud providers where company or client data was stored. The advisory adds that some affiliates exfiltrate data and extort victims without deploying ransomware.[5][1]
  • For deployment, the FBI says the actors configure malicious Group Policy Objects (GPOs) through Windows Task Scheduler. Initial deployment uses PowerShell scripts together with Cobalt Strike and disables security features in the network. In a case Mandiant tracked, immediate tasks were added to the default domain policy to disable security software, download the encryptor, and run it.[5][9]
  • In Microsoft’s cases, PsExec was the most common way to distribute the payload. The encryptor can also spread by itself: it broadcasts NetBIOS Name Service messages to find connected servers and copies itself to them with PsExec, using credentials set in its configuration. It can bypass UAC when it lacks administrator rights. It requires an --access-token argument to run, which Unit 42 says can make it harder to analyze in sandboxes.[7][10]
  • To hinder recovery, it can stop services, delete shadow copies with vssadmin and wmic, disable recovery with bcdedit, and clear event logs with wevtutil. MITRE also lists changing the desktop wallpaper on infected hosts, stopping VM services, and wiping VM snapshots.[7][6]
  • After exfiltrating or encrypting data, the actors contact victims over Tor, Tox, email, or encrypted applications. The February 2024 update describes creating victim-specific email addresses to announce the initial compromise. Affiliates may also offer “vulnerability reports” and “security recommendations” that explain how they got in and how to prevent re-victimization, as an incentive to pay.[1]
  • The mitigations CISA and its partners list include allowlisting remote access programs (blocking portable versions of unauthorized tools), phishing-resistant multifactor authentication such as FIDO/WebAuthn, logging all network traffic with EDR to detect lateral movement, and monitoring internal mail and messaging. They recommend phishing-resistant methods because push bombing and SIM swapping are known to be used by affiliates.[1]

ATT&CK techniques

Tools

Explained on this site

Other tools named in the sources

Have you patched these vulnerabilities?

We list only CVEs that a source says this group exploited and that we checked in CISA’s KEV catalog (known exploited vulnerabilities) and NVD. If your organization runs an affected product, check the vendor’s fix.

How to recognize its ransom notes

We do not publish ransom notes in full. This section gives only the clues for recognizing them.

  • CISA says the encryptor produces a file named RECOVER-(seven-character extension) FILES.txt. In Unit 42’s example, encrypted files get a random seven-character extension and the ransom note is named RECOVER-<extension>-FILES.txt, using that same extension.[1][10]
  • According to Unit 42, the note gives the URL of a Tor site with an access key unique to each victim, where the victim can see details of the attack, its data, and the actors’ demands.[10]

Sources

  1. #StopRansomware: ALPHV Blackcat (AA23-353A, updated 2024-02-27)(opens in a new tab)CISA, FBI, HHS · published 2024-02-27 · checked 2026-11-11
  2. Justice Department Disrupts Prolific ALPHV/Blackcat Ransomware Variant(opens in a new tab)US Department of Justice · published 2023-12-19 · checked 2026-11-11
  3. Two Men Who Attacked Multiple U.S. Victims Using ALPHV BlackCat Ransomware Sentenced to Prison(opens in a new tab)US Attorney’s Office, Southern District of Florida · published 2026-04-30 · checked 2026-11-11
  4. Florida Ransomware Negotiator Who Extorted and Attacked Multiple U.S. Victims Sentenced to Prison(opens in a new tab)U.S. Department of Justice, Office of Public Affairs · published 2026-07-09 · checked 2026-11-12
  5. BlackCat/ALPHV Ransomware Indicators of Compromise (FLASH CU-000167-MW)(opens in a new tab)FBI · published 2022-04-19 · checked 2026-11-11
  6. BlackCat, Software S1068(opens in a new tab)MITRE ATT&CK · checked 2026-11-11
  7. The many lives of BlackCat ransomware(opens in a new tab)Microsoft Threat Intelligence · published 2022-06-13 · checked 2026-11-11
  8. Octo Tempest crosses boundaries to facilitate extortion, encryption, and destruction(opens in a new tab)Microsoft Threat Intelligence · published 2023-10-25 · checked 2026-11-11
  9. ALPHV Ransomware Affiliate Targets Vulnerable Backup Installations to Gain Initial Access(opens in a new tab)Mandiant (Google Cloud) · published 2023-04-03 · checked 2026-11-11
  10. Threat Assessment: BlackCat Ransomware(opens in a new tab)Palo Alto Networks Unit 42 · published 2022-01-27 · checked 2026-11-11
  11. Known Exploited Vulnerabilities Catalog(opens in a new tab)CISA · checked 2026-11-11

Content updated: 2026-11-11

How we chose and wrote this page: we picked groups active in Japan from the “claims about the same case” on this site’s incidents and from ransomware.live’s counts for Japan. ransomware.live’s group descriptions were used only as leads, not as sources for the text. We do not state attribution (country or people).

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