Akira ransomware group: methods and how to recognize it
This ransomware group has been recorded attacking organizations in Japan. Every fact on this page comes from a primary source we checked, such as MITRE ATT&CK, government agencies, or security vendors’ own research. The number after each sentence points to its source.
Other names in the sources: Storm-1567[1], Howling Scorpius[2], PUNK SPIDER[2], GOLD SAHARA[2]
Records in Japan
ransomware.live records 10 claims by this group with Japan as the country (records up to 2026-11-20). These count claims, not victims. A listing does not confirm that the claimed event happened.
Worldwide, ransomware.live has recorded 1,675 postings on this group’s leak site (postings are the attacker’s claims, not counts confirmed by the victims). The first posting is dated 2023-04-12 and the last 2026-11-06 (as of 2026-11-11). The site holds 76 negotiation chats and 3 ransom-note variants for this group.
No incident in this site’s DB has a claim about the same case naming this group yet.
Source: Ransomware.live(opens in a new tab)
Overview
On November 13, 2025, the FBI, CISA, the Department of Defense Cyber Crime Center (DC3), HHS, Europol’s European Cybercrime Centre, and authorities in France, Germany, and the Netherlands updated joint advisory AA24-109A (first published April 18, 2024). It says Akira has hit businesses and critical infrastructure in North America, Europe, and Australia since March 2023.[1]
According to the advisory, Akira mainly targets small and medium-sized businesses but has also hit larger organizations across many sectors. It notes a clear preference for educational institutions and for organizations in critical manufacturing, information technology, healthcare and public health, financial services, and food and agriculture.[1]
MITRE ATT&CK lists Akira as group G1024, active since at least March 2023. It uses double extortion (stealing data before encrypting it and threatening to publish it), and there are versions that can target Windows and VMware ESXi.[2]
Cisco Talos describes Akira as a ransomware-as-a-service (RaaS) operation with affiliates, and says the affiliates actively pick newly disclosed vulnerabilities to use for initial access and privilege escalation.[3]
The early encryptor was written in C++ and used the .akira extension. From August 2023, some attacks used Megazord, a Rust-based encryptor with the .powerranges extension. CISA says Megazord has likely fallen out of use since 2024, while also saying the actors have used Megazord and Akira (including Akira_v2) interchangeably.[1]
In early September 2024, Talos identified new samples written in C++ that use the .akira extension and akira_readme.txt, matching versions from before August 2023, and assesses this as a deliberate return to earlier tooling. It assesses with moderate confidence that Megazord has faded away.[3]
According to Talos, from early 2024 Akira appeared to sideline encryption and focus on data theft alone. It assesses with low to moderate confidence that this was partly because the developers were retooling the encryptor. It later saw a potential shift back to combining encryption with data theft.[3]
CISA writes that, as of late September 2025, Akira has claimed approximately $244.17 million (USD) in ransomware proceeds.[1]
Methods
- The FBI and researchers have seen Akira get in through VPN services that had no multifactor authentication (MFA) configured. Cisco likewise says it is aware of reports that Akira is targeting Cisco VPNs without MFA. CISA lists the known vulnerabilities used for entry, including the Cisco ASA and FTD CVEs in the table below.[1][4]
- CISA’s November 2025 update says the actors gain access to VPN products such as SonicWall by stealing login credentials or exploiting vulnerabilities such as CVE-2024-40766, which it says was likely abused for initial access. It says VPN credentials may come from initial access brokers or from brute-forcing VPN endpoints, and that password spraying uses tools such as SharpDomainSpray.[1]
- Arctic Wolf investigated 30 Akira and Fog intrusions between early August and mid-October 2024 that began with a SonicWall SSL VPN, and reports that Akira was deployed in about 75% of them. None of the devices ran firmware that prevents CVE-2024-40766, but Arctic Wolf had no definitive evidence that the vulnerability was exploited and could not rule out the use of credentials obtained another way.[5]
- In the same investigation, the compromised SSL VPN accounts were local to the SonicWall devices and not integrated with a central authentication service such as Active Directory. Arctic Wolf could not confirm any case where MFA was enabled on a compromised account. Almost all VPN connections came from hosting-related ASNs. The time from VPN access to acting on objectives such as encryption was as short as 1.5 to 2 hours, and closer to 10 hours in other intrusions.[5]
- SonicWall’s advisory for CVE-2024-40766 says the vulnerability is potentially being exploited in the wild. Among its recommended actions are changing passwords for local SSLVPN users, enabling MFA for all SSLVPN users, logging SSLVPN logins, and locking accounts after repeated failed logins.[6]
- CISA describes other incidents in which the actors appear to have gained access over SSH by exploiting a router’s IP address. After tunneling through the router, they exploited vulnerabilities in unpatched Veeam backup servers (CVE-2023-27532 and CVE-2024-40711).[1]
- After getting in, the actors create new domain accounts to abuse the functions of domain controllers and establish persistence. CISA identified cases where they created an administrative account named itadm.[1]
- CISA says the actors use post-exploitation techniques such as Kerberoasting to extract credentials stored in LSASS process memory, and use credential scraping tools like Mimikatz and LaZagne to escalate privileges.[1]
- In one reported incident, the actors temporarily powered down the domain controller’s virtual machine, copied its VMDK files, and attached them to a newly created VM. That let them extract NTDS.dit and the SYSTEM hive and compromise a highly privileged domain administrator account.[1]
- For network discovery the actors use tools such as SoftPerfect, Advanced IP Scanner, and NetScan, and AdFind to query Active Directory. They use net commands and nltest /dclist and nltest /DOMAIN_TRUSTS to find domain controllers and enumerate domain trusts.[1]
- The actors commonly disable security software before moving laterally. Researchers saw them use PowerTool to exploit the Zemana AntiMalware driver and terminate antivirus processes. The 2025 update adds cases of uninstalling EDR and a bring-your-own-vulnerable-driver (BYOVD) technique using POORTRY, a signed vulnerable driver, with STONESTOP as its loader.[1]
- AnyDesk and LogMeIn are used to maintain persistence and blend in with administrator activity. For lateral movement the actors also use RDP, SSH, and MobaXterm, and run remote commands with Impacket’s wmiexec.py. Ngrok tunnels are used for command-and-control and data exfiltration traffic.[1]
- FileZilla and WinRAR are used to collect data, and WinSCP and RClone to exfiltrate it. For command-and-control channels the actors use AnyDesk, MobaXterm, RustDesk, and Cloudflare Tunnel, and send data to their servers over FTP, SFTP, and cloud storage such as Mega.[1]
- CISA writes that in some incidents the actors exfiltrated data in just over two hours from initial access. In the intrusions Arctic Wolf examined, general folders were taken for up to six months of data, while folders such as human resources and accounts payable documents were taken for up to 30 months.[1][5]
- Encryption combines the ChaCha20 stream cipher with RSA, varies the method by file type and size, and can encrypt files fully or partially. The encryptor (w.exe) uses PowerShell to delete Volume Shadow Copy Service (VSS) copies on Windows, which hinders recovery and forensic analysis.[1]
- A Linux variant targeting VMware ESXi virtual machines appeared in April 2023, after an initial focus on Windows. By default, Akira_v2 targets the /vmfs/volumes path. Its vmonly option encrypts only virtual-machine-related files, and its stopvm option stops running virtual machines.[1][3]
- In a June 2025 incident, Nutanix Acropolis Hypervisor (AHV) virtual machine disk files were encrypted. CISA says this indicates Akira has targeted hypervisors beyond its historical targeting of VMware ESXi and Hyper-V.[1]
- Microsoft reports that several ransomware operators exploited an issue (CVE-2024-37085) in which domain-joined ESXi hypervisors grant full administrative access to members of a domain group named “ESX Admins”. In several cases, use of this technique led to Akira and Black Basta ransomware deployments.[7]
- Akira does not leave an initial ransom demand or payment instructions on the victim network and does not relay them until the victim makes contact. The note gives each company a unique code and a Tor .onion URL for contact. Payment is in Bitcoin, the actors threaten to publish the data on Tor, and according to FBI reporting they have in some cases called victim companies.[1]
ATT&CK techniques
Tools
Explained on this site
Other tools named in the sources
Have you patched these vulnerabilities?
We list only CVEs that a source says this group exploited and that we checked in CISA’s KEV catalog (known exploited vulnerabilities) and NVD. If your organization runs an affected product, check the vendor’s fix.
How to recognize its ransom notes
We do not publish ransom notes in full. This section gives only the clues for recognizing them.
- Encrypted files get the .akira or .powerranges extension. The newer Akira_v2 also uses .akiranew or .aki. The Linux and ESXi version may drop a ransom note named akiranew.txt in directories where files were encrypted.[1][3]
- On Windows, the ransom note is named fn.txt or akira_readme.txt and appears in the root directory (C:\) and in each user’s home directory (C:\Users).[1]
- The note gives each company a unique code and instructions to contact the actors at a Tor .onion URL. A ransom amount and payment instructions are not given until the victim makes contact.[1]
Sources
- #StopRansomware: Akira Ransomware (AA24-109A)(opens in a new tab)
- Akira, GOLD SAHARA, PUNK SPIDER, Howling Scorpius, Group G1024(opens in a new tab)
- Akira ransomware continues to evolve(opens in a new tab)
- Akira Ransomware Targeting VPNs without Multi-Factor Authentication(opens in a new tab)
- Arctic Wolf Labs Observes Increased Fog and Akira Ransomware Activity Linked to SonicWall SSL VPN(opens in a new tab)
- SonicOS Improper Access Control Vulnerability (SNWLID-2024-0015)(opens in a new tab)
- Ransomware operators exploit ESXi hypervisor vulnerability for mass encryption(opens in a new tab)
- Known Exploited Vulnerabilities Catalog(opens in a new tab)
Content updated: 2026-11-11
How we chose and wrote this page: we picked groups active in Japan from the “claims about the same case” on this site’s incidents and from ransomware.live’s counts for Japan. ransomware.live’s group descriptions were used only as leads, not as sources for the text. We do not state attribution (country or people).