8Base ransomware group: methods and how to recognize it

This ransomware group has been recorded attacking organizations in Japan. Every fact on this page comes from a primary source we checked, such as MITRE ATT&CK, government agencies, or security vendors’ own research. The number after each sentence points to its source.

Other names in the sources: Affiliate 2803[2]

Records in Japan

ransomware.live records 10 claims by this group with Japan as the country (records up to 2026-11-20). These count claims, not victims. A listing does not confirm that the claimed event happened.

Worldwide, ransomware.live has recorded 455 postings on this group’s leak site (postings are the attacker’s claims, not counts confirmed by the victims). The first posting is dated 2022-04-03 and the last 2025-02-01 (as of 2026-11-11). The site holds 0 negotiation chats and 3 ransom-note variants for this group.

No incident in this site’s DB has a claim about the same case naming this group yet.

Source: Ransomware.live(opens in a new tab)

Overview

Cisco Talos and VMware describe 8Base as active since March 2022, with a sharp rise in activity in June 2023. Talos says the group steals data before encrypting and uses a customized version of the Phobos ransomware.[6][9]

VMware records that 8Base’s leak site described the operators as “simple pen testers.” Trend Micro says that despite the label, the group is financially motivated and uses a name-and-shame tactic.[9][10]

The encryptor VMware found was Phobos version 2.9.1 loaded by SmokeLoader, and it added “.8base” to the end of encrypted file names. Talos likewise found no significant differences between 8Base’s Phobos and other Phobos samples seen since 2019, apart from the embedded configuration.[9][7]

Europol describes Phobos as a ransomware-as-a-service (RaaS) tool first detected in December 2018 and used for high-volume attacks on small and medium-sized businesses. It says 8Base used Phobos’s infrastructure to develop its own variant and was particularly aggressive with double extortion.[1]

VMware reports that 8Base’s ransom note and leak-site text closely resemble RansomHouse’s. In a machine comparison of ransom notes, one note matched RansomHouse’s at 99%. VMware adds that it could not tell whether 8Base is an offshoot of RansomHouse or Phobos.[9]

Talos assesses with moderate confidence that Eking, Eight, Elbie, Devos, and Faust are the most common Phobos variants, as they appeared most often in the samples it analyzed. It says Eight is believed to be an older campaign run by the same group that now runs 8Base.[8]

In February 2025, Europol announced that four people leading 8Base had been arrested in an international operation. It says all four are Russian nationals suspected of using a variant of Phobos to extort high-value payments. It also says 27 servers linked to the network were taken down and that more than 400 companies worldwide were warned of ongoing or imminent attacks.[1]

Europol says the operation was supported by Europol and Eurojust and involved agencies from 14 countries. Japan’s National Police Agency is on the list of participating authorities.[1]

The U.S. Department of Justice announced charges against two Russian nationals at the same time. The indictment alleges they operated a ransomware affiliate organization that deployed Phobos, including under the names “8Base” and “Affiliate 2803.” The department says more than 1,000 public and private entities were victimized and that ransom payments exceeded $16 million. The same release states that an indictment is merely an allegation and that defendants are presumed innocent until proven guilty.[2]

The Department of Justice says Europol and German authorities announced an operation to disrupt over 100 servers associated with this network, while Europol’s own release says 27 servers were taken down. The figures differ, and neither source explains why. This page gives both with their sources.[2][1]

On 17 July 2025, Japan’s National Police Agency announced that the Cyber Special Investigation Unit of the Kanto Regional Police Bureau, with the FBI’s cooperation, had developed a tool that decrypts data encrypted by Phobos/8Base. It was provided to Europol in June 2025, and the agency says at least 2,000 victim cases have been confirmed worldwide. It urges victim companies in Japan to consult their nearest police station and says it will carry out recovery work with the tool on request.[3]

The National Police Agency’s page for the decryption tool warns that the tool has been flagged by antivirus software in some cases. If the download fails or the usage is unclear, it asks victims to contact their prefectural police cyber-incident consultation desk or the nearest police station.[4]

Methods

  • Trend Micro says 8Base mainly gains initial access through phishing emails. VMware and Trend Micro also report samples of the encryptor that were downloaded from domains that appear to be associated with SystemBC, a proxy and remote administration tool.[10][9]
  • The joint advisory by CISA, the FBI, and MS-ISAC describes the approach of Phobos actors in general: scanning for exposed RDP with IP scanning tools such as Angry IP Scanner, getting in with open-source brute-force tools, and phishing. This is not specific to 8Base; it describes Phobos as a whole.[5]
  • In an 8Base engagement handled by Talos, the legitimate remote desktop application AnyDesk was installed in the Performance Logs (Perflogs) folder, possibly to evade detection. The attackers dumped credentials from LSASS memory, created new processes with an existing user’s token to bypass access controls, escalated privileges with runas, and ran PowerShell scripts.[6]
  • Trend Micro reports that Mimikatz, LaZagne, WebBrowserPassView, VNCPassView, PasswordFox, and ProcDump were used to steal credentials. For lateral movement the operators used PsExec to deploy a batch file and the encryptor itself.[10]
  • According to Trend Micro, a batch file named defoff.bat disabled parts of Windows Defender and added the malware’s path to the exclusions through WMIC. Tools such as PCHunter, GMER, and Process Hacker were also used.[10]
  • Trend Micro reports that RClone was used to exfiltrate stolen data. For Phobos actors in general, the CISA advisory gives examples of sending data to an FTP server they control with WinSCP and to Mega.io cloud storage.[10][5]
  • Talos says 8Base’s encryptor was embedded in SmokeLoader: it is decrypted from an encrypted payload and run in the memory of the SmokeLoader process. SmokeLoader decrypts the payload in three stages.[7]
  • It encrypts with AES-256 using a different key for each file and protects that key with RSA-1024 and a hardcoded public key. Talos says files larger than 1.5 MB are only partially encrypted for speed. The malware can also scan for network shares, kill processes holding target files open, and persist through the Startup folder and Run registry keys.[7][10]
  • To block recovery, Trend Micro reports that it uses vssadmin, WMIC, bcdedit, and wbadmin to remove Volume Shadow Copies and the backup catalog, and it disables Windows Firewall. It also clears Windows event logs with wevtutil.[10][9]
  • Trend Micro also reports registry changes that weaken UAC, and changes that attach cmd.exe to accessibility programs reachable from the lock screen, such as sethc.exe and utilman.exe.[10]
  • Talos says Phobos has an option that, when enabled, stops it from running if the OS language uses the Cyrillic script.[7]

ATT&CK techniques

Tools

Other tools named in the sources

Found on infrastructure believed to be used by an actor associated with this group

The source found traces of these on an open directory believed to have been used by a threat actor associated with this group. It does not state that the group itself used them.

Have you patched these vulnerabilities?

We list only CVEs that a source says this group exploited and that we checked in CISA’s KEV catalog (known exploited vulnerabilities) and NVD. If your organization runs an affected product, check the vendor’s fix.

No CVE meets these conditions yet.

How to recognize its ransom notes

We do not publish ransom notes in full. This section gives only the clues for recognizing them.

  • Encrypted file names end with a string made of “id[...]” (the volume serial number and a generated ID), a contact email address, and then “.8base”, in that order.[10][7]
  • The ransom note is dropped on the desktop as two files, info.txt and info.hta, and info.hta is displayed with mshta.exe after encryption.[10]
  • According to VMware, the 8Base version of the note resembles Phobos’s but has no Jabber contact instructions and uses a purple background, among other differences. VMware separately found a note that matches RansomHouse’s text.[9]

Sources

  1. Key figures behind Phobos and 8Base ransomware arrested in international cybercrime crackdown(opens in a new tab)Europol · published 2025-02-11 · checked 2026-11-11
  2. Phobos Ransomware Affiliates Arrested in Coordinated International Disruption(opens in a new tab)U.S. Department of Justice · published 2025-02-10 · checked 2026-11-11
  3. ランサムウェアPhobos/8Baseにより暗号化されたファイルの復号ツールの開発について(opens in a new tab)警察庁 · published 2025-07-17 · checked 2026-11-11
  4. ランサムウェアPhobos/8Baseにより暗号化されたファイルの復号ツールの利用について(opens in a new tab)警察庁 · checked 2026-11-11
  5. #StopRansomware: Phobos Ransomware (AA24-060A)(opens in a new tab)CISA, FBI, MS-ISAC · published 2024-02-29 · checked 2026-11-11
  6. Incident Response trends Q2 2023: Data theft extortion rises, while healthcare is still most-targeted vertical(opens in a new tab)Cisco Talos · published 2023-07-26 · checked 2026-11-11
  7. A deep dive into Phobos ransomware, recently deployed by 8Base group(opens in a new tab)Cisco Talos · published 2023-11-17 · checked 2026-11-11
  8. Understanding the Phobos affiliate structure and activity(opens in a new tab)Cisco Talos · published 2023-11-17 · checked 2026-11-11
  9. 8base ransomware: A Heavy Hitting Player(opens in a new tab)VMware Carbon Black · published 2023-06-28 · checked 2026-11-11
  10. Ransomware Spotlight: 8Base(opens in a new tab)Trend Micro · published 2024-04-25 · checked 2026-11-11

Content updated: 2026-11-11

How we chose and wrote this page: we picked groups active in Japan from the “claims about the same case” on this site’s incidents and from ransomware.live’s counts for Japan. ransomware.live’s group descriptions were used only as leads, not as sources for the text. We do not state attribution (country or people).

Back to ransomware incidents and statistics